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Environmental decision making is' a complex process confounded by technical uncertalntyp oliticai' pressure, and societal interests. New calls fo,~ environmental decision-making frameworks emphasize the need for an holistic approach that incorporates technical and nontechnical expertise, and participation by all interested and affected parties. In this paper, we analyze the evaluation of an environmental regulatorl, program to characterize the interaction of science and policy and the processing of uncertaint?/using concepts from science and technology studies. This demonstrates the influence of institutional goals and commitments on the uptake and use of science and the processing of uncerta'mtF in the regulatory process. We discuss the implications of such analyses on the development of new environmental decision-making frameworks.
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The anthors are grateful to Davld Guston and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on earher drafts of tbas paper They also thank the manerous participants m the Smog Check 1I evaluatma process who have supported this research Funding for this Froject was provided by the EPA STAR Graduate Fellowslup program and the Ulnverslty of Cahforma Dlssertatlon Year Fellowship R~gu ESOLVI~, G COMPLEX envaronmenmt lator3 ~ssues reqmres consideration of e techaucal, pohtmal, and societal lmphcat~ons of a declmon Several national studies have recognized this requirement and have suggested integrated or hohstlc methods for approaclung complex enwronmental declslon making Such frameworks include broader societal and polmcal conslderatlons, pamclpataon of all interested and affected parties, and maintaining a sound sclentlfic basis (NRC, 1996 , Presldentmt/Congresslonal Conmussmn on 1Rask Assessment and Rask Management, 1997) Exastmg declslon-makmg parachgms such as costbenefit analys~s or unhty theory do not prowde conceptual or procedural connectmns between these cons~demtmns Nonetheless, most of the work on integrated decmmn making to date has centered on constructing methods that rely on decision analytic methods such as multmttnbute uttht~ analysis and its variants and derwatwes (Keeney and Rmffa, 1976 , Merkhofer and Keeney, 1987 , Hong and Apostolakls, 1993 , Reckhow, 1994 , Apostolakls and Pickett, 1998 In thls paper, we explore uncertainty m envaronmental regulation using methods and theones from science and technology st-aches (STS) Tlus analys~s demonstrates why tt ~s dtfficult, if not maposstble, to represent enwronmental dec~smns fully using a utahtartan or cost-benefit methodology We examine a specific case m regulatory enwrormlental dec~smn makang, the evaluauon of Cahforma's motor vehicle mspectmn and maintenance program, and show how interactions of setence and policy and the processing of uncertainty shape the regulatory &scourse through argument formation and debate Further, we argue that an understanding of the science pohey mterface and the treatment of uncertainty m the deczslon-matang process provides a strong conceptual and analylacal foundauon through w~ch environmental dee]stun making can be analyzed and understood ~rtule exploratory m nature, tt~s paper alms to demonstrate the power of narrauve or descnpUve approaches, such as STS, m the study and practice of env~romuental regulatord eclsmn makang
Expertise. uncertain~, and decision making
Tradmonal models of the science pohcy mteractmn represent sczence as a source of objecUve truth that grades the dee~smn-makmg process (the 'truth speaks to power" model) This model has served to reform and advocate the appheatmn of cost-benefit and uUhtanan models to declsxon making Inmghts provaded by researchers m STS and other fields have demonstrated that tins model of the science pohey relatmnslnp Is illusive (see, for example, Majone, 1989 , Jasanoff, 1990 . Herrlck and Jamaeson, 1995 . Elmnga. 1997 , Jager, 1998 ) Shefla Jasanoff has sho~a how sclentlfic knowledge and 'facts' are contingent and constructed, resulting m their deeonstrucUon m the regulatory arena (Jasanoff, 1986 (Jasanoff, , 1987 (Jasanoff, , 1990 These ctmUenges to the authority and legmmacy of science result m attempts to construct boundaries Boundaries and their assocmted 'boundary work" are attempts to classify knowledge, mformatmn, or even people and groups as legntnnate vs dlegltlmate, selenufic vs unselenUfic, or resider vs outmder (Cneryn, 1983 , Jasanoff, 1990 ) These processes of deconstrueUon, boundary defmmon, and boundary maintenance often brmg sclenUfic inputs and, especially, uncertam~ rote the center of regulatory debates and challenges both as the issues of contentmn and as leveragmg tools Simon Shaclde~ and Brian Wymae have demonstrated how &fferent interpretations of the same techmcal phenomenon, uncertainty, or fact can se~'e as a means of commumcaUon across these boundaries between 6tfferent soeml groups or "worlds" (Shacldey and Wynne, 1996) In tl~s role, facts. phenomena, and uncertainties serve as "'boundary.
objects" or "boundary ordering dewces" (Gmryn, 1983 (Gmryn, , 1999 In addmon to its traportance at the boundaries between socml worlds, uneertam.ty serves as a powerful means to promote aCtlor~ mactmn, or delay m the regulatory arena (Majone, 1989 , Funtowlez and Ravetz, 1990 Campbell shows how uncertainty can serve as a locus of debate among experts and as a strategic tool that enables an expert to maintain authority m a gwen situation (Campbell, 1985) Susan Lelgh Star b.~s shown ho~ tmcertamty is used to reffy the authority of science through the transformation of local uncertamtms rote globally-accepted certainties that are managed and controlled by science, thereby rnamtaming ~ts authority (Star, 1985) In addauon to the d~scusmon of ~ts role as a rhetorical and strategic tool, the meamng of the word 'uncertainty' has been d~seussed and defined by many d~fferent researchers Several defmlUons and classifications of uncertainty exist m the envaronmental pohcy hterature As Table I ~llustrates, these range from definmons that are primarily techmeal to those that encompass a broader, construcUvast wow of scxentrfic mformaUon and the dec~smn-makmg process
The breadth m the defmmon of uncertainty suggests ~t ~s more tlmn a staust~cal or probab~hst}c phenomenon Rather, uncertainty extends from data and models rote supposmons based on that mformaUon, problem deflmUons, and the design of soluuons The breadth in the definition of uncertainty suggests that it is more than a statistical or probabilistic phenol~aenon: it extends from data and models into suppositions based on that information, problem definitions, and the de,,dgn of solutions
The s~x classtficatmns shown m Table 1 range from those that are predominantly techmcally based, focusing on data and models (Morgan and Hennon, 1990) , through those that address uncertainty m the pohcy proces~ including commumcaUon and problem frarrang (Rowe, 1994 , Shrader-Frechette, 1996 , to those that address ep~stemlc hnutatlons to sclenee and the realm of Ignorance (Funtovacz and Ravetz, 1990~ 19,92, Wynne~ 1992 , NRC, 1996 Drawing on these defmmons of uncertainty and insights unto the mteracUon of scmnce and pohcy from STS, we examine an environmental regulatory process and the associated uncertainty m detad Our analysis demonstrates why expanded defu-utmns of uncertainty are needed to understand the envaronmental regulatory process Further, our analyms of the mterjectmn of science and uncertainty into the regulatory chseourse prorides an account of how actors m the regulatory demsmn-makmg process construct arguments through the presentation and mterpretatmn of scientific mformation~ and the mterpretatmn and emphasis on chfferent types and sources of uncertainty Together, these character~stms of the environmental regulatory process suggest that understanding the process of applying scientific mformauon to enwronmental regulatmn ~s an essentml component of understandmg the arguments, controvermes, and aclaons m envtronraentaI regulatmn ownerstup of the vetu.cle, depending on the aLr quality m each geographic region wttlun the state All testing was performed at privately owned service statmns using a two-speed taflp~pe test The Clean Atr Act Amendments of 1990 reqmred that the most polluted areas of the state tmplement enhanced I/M as defined by the USEPA Enhanced I/M was designed to reduce the impact of fraudulent testing, tampering, and cheating on the performance of I/M programs by separating test and repair and to use hlgh-tech testing eqmpment stated to modem technology vehlcles (USEPA, 1995) Currently, there are three dLfferent forms of the Smog Check program m place m different geograptuc regaons m Calff-orma --basac areas, ehange-of-m~aershap areas, and enhanced areas 4 Smog Check II testing is only m place m the enhanced areas
The serrate statmn industry m Cahfomm resasted amplementmg USEPA's enhanced I/M program because of the loss of emassmns-testmg revenue (repmrs could stall be performed under a centrahzed program) and the 1ugh cost of the IM240 test eqmpmeat Because of these pressures and concerns about consumer convemence, Cahfonua was reluctant to create a completely centrahzed program lhke the one the USEPA reqmred After the Clean Aar Act Amendments of 1990, Cahforma entered negoUaUon wlth the USEPA and reached an agreement m 1994 to create Smog Check II, the hybrid program currently m place m the state's most senous non-attainment areas Tlus progralTl lS all maportant part of the SIP, the regulatory document the state as required to subrmt to USEPA showing how and when areas of the state that do not meet the naUonal ambaent mr quahts' standards will come into comphance Smog Check lI contmns some of the elements of USEPA's prototype enhanced program, but maretams a network of independent statmns that perform both test and repmr Tins case study focuses on the evaluation of tins hybrid program, whach was reqmred after two years of program operatmn
Evaluanon process
The USEPA's final rule on enhanced mspectaon and maintenance programs reqmres states to evaluate their I/M prograras baenmally, beginning two years after the unplementaUon of mspectaons 0LISEPA, 1992) In Callforma. the evaluataon process is a polmcally contenuous ~ssue for a number of reasons To begin with, the program is not achieving the en-assmn reductions that ~t ~s obhgated to m the SIP (ARB. 1994 (ARB. , 2000 A failure to meet the SIP reqmrements affects the state's ttmelme to meet federal air quahty standards, whach can, m turn, affect the state's reeeapt of federal funding for transportaUon projects Smog Check II has also been a pohucal 'hot' issue an Calfforma since the enhanced program was proposed following passage of the 1990 Clean Aar Act Amendments, attracting the anterest of clasmc car collectors, serwce stations, and motonsts Inst~tutaonally, Smog Cheek 17 evaluatmn as a complex process as well The Bureau of Automotave Repair (BAR), a &wsmn of the Cahfemm Department of Consumer Asr~asrs is responsible for overseeing the program Table 2 shows the regulatory agencaes revolved m Smog Check and thetr respons~bdmes Both the Atr Resources Board (ARB) and the Inspectmn and Maintenance Rewew Comnuttee (IMRC) are responsible for evaluating the program While the purposes of the two e~'aluatmns are different (ARB prepares an evaluatmn to be subrmtted to the legislature and USEPA to demonstrate SIP comphance, and the IMRC prepares an evaluataon to be gwen to the state legislature) the pubhc presentatmn of the results tughhghts amportant differences between the two organxzatmns These differences ernst m the agencaes' m~ssmns, conumtments, and accountability
In addmon to the polmcal and mstltutmnal challenges, the evaluation process as a techmcally complex endeavor because of the difficulty both m obtmmng data and m selecting an evaluataon methodologw The vanablhty of the driving cycle, macertamty m measurement, and the influence of driver behawor combine w~th other factors to make ~t very problematac to obtain representatave vehicle ermsmons da(a Given the challenges encountered m obtmmng representatave data, there are often many mformataon gaps that must be filled m the evaluataon process When m£ormatlon *s lacking, ermsslons models can be used to t511 m data gaps, but the models remain highly uncertain These teebaucal challenges provide a hvely barns for regulatory debate, particularly since there is no single, agreed upon method for program evaluation
Evaluation as regulatory scwnce
Gaven the context and the regulatory motwatlon for the evaluation, the evaluation process closely resembles regulatory science as defined by Jasanoff (1990, page 80 ) She defines three mare components of regulatory scmnce knowledge production, knowledge sycthesIs, and prechctaon (t990, page 77) The Smog Check evaluation process shows evidence of all three knowledge production m the gathenng of enusslons data, knowledge synthesis m the analysis of th).s data, and elements of prechcuon are seen how thls mformatmn is brought together and how it is presented as a measure of program effeetweness
Another aspect of the evaluatmn process that reflects the charaetenstms of the regulator 3, science ~s m the ARB's and the IMRC's use of "boundar3, work' Jasanoff describes boundary work as a process of identff3nng who is m and who Is out, or m what realm a pamcular issue lies (1990, page 14) the presentation of evaluatmn results, the ARB and the IMRC attempted to maintain a boundary between the 'numbers' and the pohey recommendatmns [n 1MRC public meetings, the committee chairperson continually expressed a desire to maretam. a separatmn between the "findings of fact", s or the evaluation results, and policy recommendatmns based on these findings At one point the IMRC chmrperson stud " l want to really emphasize --it is maporrant to separate out the empmcal results from any ~ecornmendatmns The results smaply tell us what do we know, what do we observe Judgements about pohcy have to take into account such things as --where do we need to be with respect to the federal law They need to take into account cons~deratlons about Impacts on different umverses of cmzens m the State of Cahfigrma let us not mingle the two ,,6
Through tins boundary constructmn, the committee attemptx~d to protect the finchngs from polmcal mfiuences so that they remained legntmmte bases for the comrmttee's pohey recommendatmns
In the Ught coupling of pohey and scmnoe m the regulatory science process, uncertainty is often the locus of debate k is used to bolster and support oplmons, agendas, and conflicts (Jasanoff, 1990 , Sctence and uncertainty m envtronmental regulatmn FtmtoWlCZ and Ravetz, 1992 , Ozawa, 1996 , van Asselt and Rotmans, 1996 Uncertainty is amphfied or ignored, or somettmes a combmataon of the two, depending on the mot~va-tmn of dafferent actors (Wynne, 1987) In a regulatory decision-making process, uncertainty can be used to advocate precautaon m pursuing potentmlly harmful enwronmental choices (the Precautionary Principle), to advocate costeffectweness, or to delay regulatory aetaon altogether Uncertainty serves as an mfiuentlal rhetoncal and strategic devace m envaronmental regulation and decision mahng
Uncertainty in the Smog Check II evaluation
Before the completmn of e~ther of the evaluatmns, a member of the IMRC stated m an mtervlew that ff their evaluation " shows that [Smog Cheekl as falhng well short of the mark,. I think that you will get people stmply chsputmg the data ,,7
Uncertainty m evaluatwn reports
Several techmcal uncertamt|es affect the evaluatmn process As was acknowledged m almost every interview conducted, the data that is avatlable on I/M program performance is often contradaetory, chfficult to obtain, and generally scarce In addmon, many data sources have been used to challenge the vall&ty of UM programs by supporting a eharactenzatmn of velucle ermsmons and driver behavaor that eontradints the characteristics represented or addressed m current I/M program design and the models that are used to predmt their benefits (Lawson, 1993 , 1995 , Stedman eta!, 1997 , 1998 Given the controversy over data and ,ts use m cnttqnes of I/M programs, data selectmn and avaflablhty is a very n-aportant component of the evaluatmn process Snnply put, data on veinele enusslons are needed for the evaluatmn of an I/M program to esumate emasslons before and after a Smog Check II inspection m order to arnve at an esttrnate of program benefits Several different sources of data were avmlable m the Smog Check 11 evaluataon First, mflhons of enussions measurements are collected when veineles have thezr scheduled Smog Check ]I inspection (close to nine rmlhon vehicles are tested per year) These data are contmned m the Vebacle Identffieatmn Database (VID). and are referred to \qD data Second, roadside inspections have been conducted by BAR on tens of thousands of veincles that were randomly pulled over In a roadside mspectJonẽ mmmons are measured using the Smog Check II mspectaon protocol (roadside data)
Finally, some velucle measurements are taken usmga remote sensing dexaee (RSD) that uses a spectrophotometer to measure emissions m an exhaust plume as a veincle drives by a specific location
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Uncertainties that arise in relation to the data are in measurement, variability, reliability, and the clara's ability to represent actual on-road vehicle emissions: each of these needs to be managed in the calculation of program benefits (Bishop and Stednmn, 1996) Such a measurement taken wathout stopping the velucle and w~thout even, necessarily, notifying the driver (RSD data)
A number of uncertamtaes are assocmted wath measuring vetncle ermsslons m general and, spemficall),, m relating tbas data to evaluating program effectweness (Wenzel et aI, 2000) The uneertmntaes that arise m relation to the data are generally measurement uncertainty, vanabfllty (aleatory uncertainty), data rehablhty, and the aNhty of the data to represent actual on-road vehaete emlssmns Each of these needs to be managed m the ealculataon of program benefits No single evaluation methodology has been accepted by the I/M cornmumty (p~amanly consastmg of scientists, regulators, and techmcmns), and, therefore, no one data source ~s accepted as being the best one for evaluation
In addition to ermsslons measurements, regulator 3, agenmes rel) on ermssmn factor models to esttmate the emIssmn contribution from mobde sources EPA uses the series of MOBILE models Cahforma uses its own series called EMFAC A complete &scus-stun of the critiques and hmttatmns of these models is beyond the scope of ttus paper, but numerous studaes have ~awn attentmn to flaws m them Crmclsms mclude underestmaatmg on-road vehIcte enussmns, poor representatmn of tugh ermtters, and poor modeling of evaporatwe emass~ons (for more detailed discussion of enuss~on factor models, see Fuj~ta et al, 1992 , GAO, 1997 , Harley et al, 1997 , Pollack et al, 1999~ NRC, 2000 . Sawyer et al, 2000 Desplte these criticisms, Mates are reqmred to use an approved ermsslon factor model m their SIPs to demonstrate the ermssmn reductmns that ,~U be actueved by an I/M program (USEPA_ 1992) Both enussmns measurements and enuss~on factor models were an invaluable source of mformat~on used by the groups m the evaluatmn process Inspectmn and rnamtenance program evaluataon is an ac-V.ve area of research and there ts no single accepted method for the evaluatmn of a program hke Smog Check II (USEPA, 1998 , Coordinating Research Council, 2000 As was mentioned earlier, both the ARB and/MRC completed evaluatmns of the Smog Check II program Table 3 shows elements that were m each of the reports, including data that were used, evalua~aon goals, and the treatment of uncertainty Each of the evaluatmn reports &scussed the tmcertamtaes and lnmtations m the available data, and, m each, the agency ldenttfied how ,t was planning to respond to, and manage, these tmcertamt~es The two styles were qmte different The IMRC report de&-eared several pages, and spent a great deal of ttme m pubhc meetings, chscussmg the tmcertamtaes and complexaUes m evaluating an I/M program In the face of this uncertainty, IMRC stated that it prowded "a range of benefit esttmates that reflects the tmcertamty inherent m estmaatmg tons-per-day emission reduct,ons'" (IMRC, 2000) On the other hand, ARB bnefl!¢ discussed uncertamDes m the data sources and then selected one type of data on which to base zts analysts, stating that at was using the "best available data from a real world standpoint" (ARB. 2000) From ttus point on, it dad not dascuss tmcertmn~ m the data or the anatys~s, but only an relataon to the IM-RC report Where data were unavadable, both evaluations requtred assumptmns to fill m the gaps ARB used the current versmn of Cahforma's ermssmn factor model, EMFAC2000, to make esttmates of program performance (ARB, 2000) The IMRC evaluators made assumptmns and prowded bounding esttrnates to examine the sensmv~ty of its predactmn of program benefits to these assumptions (/MRC, 2000) In splte of the tmcertamtles, each report prowdes an estimate of program benefits m tons per da) of emassmn reductmns attributable to Smog Check II As Table 3 shows, these esUmates do overlap, despite dtfferences m the methodoIog~es and data used Nonetheless, the fact that the two reports dad not match up exactly threatened the legmmacy of the evaluatmn process Both the ARI3 and IMRC focused on the differences between the reports and used these dafferences as a bas~s for crmqumg the other's report and defending its own As the two reports were released to the same body of interested and affected pames, debates inevitably arose over the vahdaty and appropriateness of each of the studies Pubhc debate and &scussmn was facflltated by the 1MRC's regular, pubhc meetings that are reqmred m the committee's governing legaslatmn 9
Each of these reports had a &fferent regulatory mandate and sought to answer a dafferent set of questmns Challenges arose over wbach data set was appropriate --roadside data versus VID data Questmns were posed about the method of armlysls and, m particular, the approprmte role of models Finally, the questmn arose regarding the tmportar~ce and relevance of the SIP cormmtment as an evaluatmn criterion These three debates formed the basis of the regulatory dascourse that developed surrounding the evaluaUon process
Uncertainty m the regulatory &scourse
Given the numerous uncertainties m the available data and models, it is not surpnsmg that tmcertamty was CO not reported These numbers cannot be compared to AREs finaf numbers (in the final row) because the ARB estimate is reported m "SIP currency" which i,, determined using the EMFAC model These estimates of emission reductions are from analysis of the roadside pullover data b These hgures represent the "best estimate" of emissmons benefits from the Smog Check 11 program, including estimates of prorespect=on, pretest repair, and removal of vehicles from the program area They do not include estimstss of evaporatwe emmslon benefits The SIP eshmates o{ program performance were calculated using the EMFAC7F model This model Is now known to underest,mate emlss)cns Therefore, to reduce emissions 1 ten per day m EMFAC7F, or "SIP currencỹ , ~ is necessary to reduce emissions more than 1 ton per day m the "real world" In order to compare their numbers calculated from the roadside analysts to the SIP, ARB had to translate these values into "SIP currency" (ARB, 2000, page V-l) nnportant m the regulato~ d~scourse surrounding the evaluat~(m However, m contrast to the evaluation reports that focused on uncertainties m data and models, the pubh e d~scuss~on focused on the dafferences m how these uncertamtaes were addressed The tmcertamt~es that were revealed and h~ghhghted through the regulatory chs,zourse lay m methodological and ep~stemo-logical d~fferences m the evaluataon processes and not m the data More spec~fi~Aly, the d~scuss~on focused on the ~aanagement of the uncertainties assocmted wzth evaluation m each of the reports The regulatory dxscourse was dominated by fl~ree debates over the select~on of d~ta, the method of evaluation, and the evaluat~o~ criterion These debates were framed m techmca[ terms and focused on ~ssues assocmted wzth uncertamb, m evaluation data and methods, but also relented to institutional commitments mud agendas
SelectTng data what you don't know can hurt you
Imme&ately, upon release of the two reports, questions arose over which was the appropriate type of data to use Each data set has ~ts own ltmtataons and advantages ARB argued that the IMRC's use of the VII) data was not vahd because ~t does not account for the effect of pre-mspect~en rnamtenance and repmr Thus, a vehicle could have an unoffieml pro-test, be repaired, and then pass the test w~thout being registered m the VID Then the emissions benefits achaeved by the pro-test mad repmr are not counted ARB argued that tbas ~ssue mvahdated the VID data as a tool for program evaluation In addataon, VID data are subject to the influences of fraud and cheating that occur m the Smog Check II stations ARB argued that these issues mean that VID data are not appropnate for evaluation The IMRC evaluators, on the other Mad, wlule admlltmg lun/tatmns, argued that the VID dam provided an excellent opportumty for examtmng &verse aspects of the program because of the large number of measurements Thls allows the VID data to be broken into smaller groups to look at subpopulations of the vehicle fleet In addmort, the VID contains several measurements for some of the vehicles because of the change-of-ownerslup requtrement~° and allows for a temporal comparison of Smog Check II testing data before and after mspeetlons At the same tame, the IMRC baghhghted that the roadside data used by ARB contains potential samphng biases because of soclo-economac dafferences across sampling areas Other biases m the data can arise fi'om tmamg of the inspections and the hm~ted popular, on of vehicles that are captured ARB argued that roadside data are the most accurate representanon of on-road vehicle ermsslons because you capture the vebacles m the con&tlon that they are driven and, ldeaUy, you measure emissions of veludes m propomon to the amount that they are danven on the road
EvaluatTon method getting from data to answers
A central questmn raised by each of the groups was not only what data dad the other group select, but how did ~t apply that data Each group crmqued the other's report vclth respect to the evaluation methodology Tbas focus on method seemed a natural locus for cntimsm and critique of the reports When it became e~ndent that the ARB study would be released at the same tune as the IMRC's and that they both provided estmaates of tons-per-day emission reductions, one ARB staff member sazd " our real concern became ~ do the numbers match up9 And, more important than do the numbers match up, ff the methodology is &f-ferent, ~s it going to be as cre&ble or accurate as the methodology that was chosen for the ARB/BAR report9 ''H Much of the debate focused on the application of data and the response to uncertainty The debate over method became, m some ways, a battle of slmphclty versus complemty. The IMRC critiqued the ARB for hiding assumpraons that were made m its analysis and oversmaphf3nng the analyms The IMRC also critiqued the ARB's use of EM-FAC2000, pointing to the numerous uncertamtms and [mutations m enussions-factor models ~2 Overall, IMRC argued hhat the ARB was not clear m revealing the uncertainties and assumptions inherent m its analysts
The ARB defended ~ts methodology and data selection, stating the methods used data that reqmred
The regulatory discourse was dominated by three debates: sdection of data (what you don't know can hurt you); method of evaluation (getting from data to answers); and evaluation criteria (is the target 110 tons per day emission reduction) the fewest "'leaps of faith" ~3 At the same tame, the ARB pointed to the complexity of the LMRC's methodology It questioned the IMRC about why it dad not use a mmpler methodology, stating that a mrnpler method was relevant because ARB dad it that way ~4 Further, the ARB argued that the IMRC report d~d not dascuss the limitations of the VID data m a manner that reflected thetr seriousness
Evaluation crztena 110 zs the magTc number
The tturd debate that dominated the regulatory doscourse was over evaluanon criteria One metric of success of the Smog Check LI program as the t 10 tons per day of em~sslon reductmns attributed to Smog Check IIm the 1994 ozone SIP Given the uncertainty' an the models used to predact program performance m the SIP, the relevance of that number as an evaluation metrm was a point of dasagreement For ARB, the SIP is a defining document, at outlines how and when the state will comply with clean mr guldelmes As such, the ARB emphasized the Importance of the SIP commitment as an evaluatmn metric For ARB, the SIP and the regulatory mandate that xt comes create a ~orld in wluch its relevance cannot be ignored, and, therefore, it defined the ARB's evaluatmn method Having a &fferent regulatory mandate, the IMRC does not imbue the SIP comrmtment w~th the same importance 16 Therefore. the IMRC wowed the SIP cornrmtment as a regulatory artlfact~ and not a measure of program success that was relevant to its evaluation The IMRC's goat was focused on completing a ngorous and scientifically defensible evaluation In one pubhc meeting, the chmrperson of the IMRC sXated '° the novel and path-breaking aspect of this report is that it attempts to get out of that cycle ~acknowledgmg the unportance of the 20
Scmnce and Pubhc Pohcy February 2002
SIP for a legal standpoint_ but also aclmowledging that there is a big wide world out there, lots of complex things going on w~.h Smog Check, and we want to get a grip on those ,,~7
For IMRC, the goal was to achaeve scientific ~deals and ~gor, further evidenced by ats employment of contractors from Lawrence Berkeley Natmnal Laboratory, a Inghly respected sc|entific mstatutaon, to perform the evaluataon and the chmrperson's fierce attempts to maintain a separatmn between anal~cal results ~a~d policy reeomrnendaUons The clash over these dafferent mterpretatmns of the SIP comnutment remained firmly entrenched throughout the evaluatmn process In its final report, ARB wrote that, '~here are still s~gmficant chsagreements between the UM Revaew Cornrmttee and [the] ARB regardmg the need and trnportance of considering the SIP targets, and program performante m relation to those targets" (ARB, 2000, page ES-5) Likewise, m its final report, the IMRC states that the "[r]esponsxbthty for evaluating Cahforma's SIP comphance rests solely w~th the ARB" (IMRC, 2000, page ES-6)
Uncertainty m evaluatton reports and dtscourse
In a sense, the concept of uncertainty changes as we look at the evaluaUon reports and the regulatory d~s-course surroanCmg the evaluation process In the reports° uncertamt-y as chscussed m terms of measurement msues, lmutaUons m data, and complexities m models However~ m the regulatory debates and chscourse, uncertmntaes were &scussed m terms of selectmn of data, methods of evaluauon, and seleclaon of evaluation criteria For example, the debate over dalxt selectmn focused on what the data can and cannot l~ell you, not how uncertain a gwen measurement is These debates h~ghhght the influence of msutuhonal comrmtments and responsabflmes on the use of sc~enttfic mformat~on m the regulatory process Even though the ~ssues that formed the basas of the debates were framed m technical terms (modeling vs empmcal data, roadside pullover data vs VII) data) these issues were very. closely t~ed to mststutlonal frames and eommmnents ARB defended its methodology and data selectmn hlghhghtmg the tmportance of the SIP comn~tment and Its relevance to ARB's methods and evaluaUon For ARB. this creams a snnphclty m Its rmsslon and methods that ~s reflected m its arguments m the debate For ARB, ttus analysis was sunpl 3, meant to "check off a box" iT he I MRC, on the other hand, defended ~ts representaUon of the uncertamues and its response to the uneertmntles as being more robust Further, m ~ts final report, the IMRC stated that the SIP was not its responstbfla~v For the IMRC, the SIP does not deflue ~ts mstltuUonal rmssmn or respons~blhty IMRC valued the sc~entffic cre&bfllty of ~ts report, winch ~s S~ence and uncertainty tn envtronmental regulation clear m its focus on the robusmess of its analysis as well as mats focus on the complemty of the evaluation process Tins ~mportance is evident m the IMRC's chairperson's desenptmn of the report as "novel and path-breakang ' 19 The uncertainties that dominated the regulatow chscourse were not only related to the uncertainty m the data and models, but to how that relates to the mstatutmn's goals and respov~btlmes In one sense, tins creates a new layer of uncertainty introduced by the uptake and apphcat~on of uncertain mfonnaUon into evaluatmn methods and results Therefore, understanding uncertainty, and ~ts tmpaet on regulatory dec~smn making is incomplete ff uncertainties m the scientific methods and data are consadered alone Because of the relauonstup between evalualaon methods and regulator), goals, the dominant uncertainty in the discourse ~s no longer one that can be described through statistical or analyucal methods 20 One way to better understand these tmcertamt~es, as is shown by tbas case. ~s through descnpuve or narratwe anaIys~s
Discuss~o~ and implications
The Smog Check ]I evaluation process as a tughly uncertain and contentmus regulatory process that demonstrates the influence that science and uncertainty have on the construction of arguments The avadable data and models are amportant to the process, but even more slgmficant Is how pames select amongst the mformatmn, mter-pret and respond to uncertainties, and set criteria for evalual~on
The two evaluation reports were never reconciled and neaher the ARB nor the IMRC ever fully accepted the other's methods and results The reason for the lack of resolution hes m the differences m the groups' mstltutmnal goals and commitments, and the ways in which the two groups selected data, analyzed that data, and set regulator3, performance standards that reflect these goals These dtftbrences not only created the framework v~tinn which each group conducted ~ts evaluation, but they also shaped the regulatory debates and discourse In the reports, uncertainties were chscussed and analyzed wth respect to the evaluation methodotogy Then, m the debates and discourse, tins discussion extended to the mst~tutaonai goals and commitments that Influenced d~scusslon of data and methods m the report Wath tins shaft, the uncenamUes that became the focus of the debate were not only related to uncermmUes m the data, but to how those uncertamUes were treated and responded to in the two reports
The process of constructing a regulatory argument, m tins case, about how Smog Check II is performing, ~s complex W~thout analyzing and understanding how the ARB and the IMRC each selected data and methods to perform their evaluation, the source of d~sagreement ~s eluswe D~sagreement Science ~nd Pubhc Pohcy February 2002 21 over the value of data sources and the appropriate evaluation methodology are not hnked m purely techmeal or scientific sources, but to m~tuUonal goals and comnuUuents, or to the context m wbaeh the evaluation is being conducted Understanding the debates and uncertamtms observed m the regulatory discourse reqmres an analysis of the sclenUfic, msntuuonal, and polmeal components of the regulatory process as a whole and not as separate parts Other researchers have observed and noted the influence of interests and goals on the constmcUon of arguments m pohcy debates (see, for example, Hernck and Jarmeson, 1995 on acld ram. Soneryd and Uggla. 2000 on planning declsaons m Sweden, and Majone. 1989 , Roe, 1994 , Schon and Rein, 1994 for more general &seussmn)
Because of the trnportanec of how arguments are constructed m the regulatory d~scourse, the Smog Cheek II evaluation process demonstrates a crucial weakness m utlhtanan decision analytic techmques for use m understanding and de, eloping environmental decls~on-makang frameworks Ut:htanan methods such as cost-benefit anatysls are 'endsoriented', focusing sole|y on decls|on outcomes These methods cannot account for the context of the env:ronmental dec~smn making and regulator~ processes In other words, the3, do not incorporate reformation on the formauon of values or arguments For example, ApostoIakls and Pickett (1998) attempted to tmplement an analytic-dehberatwe process, lake that enwsmned by the National Research Council (NRC. 1996) , for a remediation project They used the analyt~c-hlerarehy process to assess the priorities of stakeholders as input to a mulUattribute utfllty anaIys~s Despite several surveys and chscussmns vath the participants, the decision anal~m outcome based on the multmtmbute ut~hty analys~s was, m the end, unacceptable to the stakeholders (Apostolakas and Pickett, 1998) z'
The reason for the failure to find an acceptable solut:on lay m the fact that the declslon anatyac methods could not allununate the stakeholders' underlying, long-term, and rather negative feehngs about the mst~tuuon responsible for cleaning up the s~te These feelings created the context w~thua wluch the decision was to be made and they were not included m the analyUc-dehberaUve process
The Apostolakas and Pickett ease illustrates the weakness m uUhtanan methods as apphed to environmental decisions Combined with the evidence of the influence of mstltuUonal goals and comrrnunents on the uptake and use of sclence and the processing of uncertainty na envarormaentat regulatory process from our analysis, these cases demonstrate that an altematave framework is needed to understand environmental regulatory deelsmn making Our analysts demonstrates the value of a narrauve and descnpuve approach for unders'tandmg the influence of tnstltuUonal goals and comnutrnents on the processing of scaence and mnoertamty and the construction of arguments and debates m the envaronmental regulatory process As our analysis of the Smog Check II evaluaUon process reveals, the uptake and use of scmnttfic mformaUon and uncertainty is influenced by the msUtutmnal context of the declslon making To understand controversy and debate m the envaronmental regulatory process, tbas influence needs to be recogmzed m the methods used for the development of frameworks for envaromaaental declsmn making Our ease study demonstrates the usefuhaess of narrarave and descriptive analysis of the processing of uncertainty m the regulatory process for acluevang tins goal
Other methodolog:es that incorporate narmtave and descnpuve analysis of the enw, ronmentat regulatory process include frame analysis as described by Sehon and Rein (Sehon and Rem, 1994, Rein and Schon, 1996) , the STS, boundary approach employed by Jasanoff (1990) , or narratzve pohcy analysls as descnbed by Roe (1994) Each of these methods has the advantage of examining the constmctaon of arguments and their mteracUon m the regulatory process LLke the method employed m fins analysis, these approaches to understanding and evaluating envaronmentaI decmmn making allow for the consideration of the context of decls~on making, whmh is erucml for the development of effeetwe enwronmental dec~smn making frarneworÑ otes 1 The NAAQS are set by the EPA for s~x cr~tena pollutants carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dlo×~de, sulfur d~ox~de, particulate matter, and lead 2
The term "attainment" refers to whether or not an area of the country meets the national ambmnt e=r qual=ty standard for a g~ven pollutant Areas are class=fled by the EPA according to their degree of non--atta~nment extreme, senous, severe, and worse States w~th areas that are out of attainment are required to submit a plan, known as a State Imptementabon Plan, to EPA, demonstrating how and when the nonattainment areas will come Into complmnce w~th the atr qual=ty standards Areas wth more severe atr pollutmn are a~towed more t=me to come trite attainment 3
The IM240 =s a 240-seccnd dynamometer test that =s a subset cf the Federal Test Procedure, the, test used to certify that new veh=cles meet emission standards and fuel effic=ency requirements 4
The areas of the stats subject to Sine9 Check II are the urban=ed portions of Los Angeles, Ventura, and San D~ego, the metropolitan area of Sacramento, Shrhng, 1999) They term the combmahon of nsk, uncerfamty, ignorance and ambiguity as "mcartr~ude" to dehneate ~t from the "traditmnal" defin[tmn of uncertainty In their case work, they note the tendency to try to treat ignorance and Intractz=ble uncertainty using propablilstJc methods, despite their inadequacy 21 A senes of papers discuss this attempt to implement the analytlc-dehberstlve process using uhhtanan declslonanalyL~c tools The one cEted m the text as an overview, others include (Accorsl et el, 1999a (Accorsl et el, , 1999b New calls for envlrom~ental decismn-makmg frarne~orks emphasxze the need for an hohstic approach that incorporates technical and non-tectuucal expertise, and participation by all interested and affected parties We analyze the evaluatmn of an environmental regulatory program to characterize the interaction of sctence and pohcy and the processmg of uncertainty using concepts from S&T studms This demonstrates the influence of msUtuttonal goals and commitments on the uptake and use of smen~e and the processing of urmertamty in the regulator./process We discuss the tmphcahons of such analyses on the development of new envlromnental declmon-makmg frameworks This paper zs a study of the measures used by what the author calls "the energy estabhshre.ant" in the UK to hinder the development of wave energy fron, the time of the invention m the mld-70s of se~,eral devines designed to convert sea waves into elecmmty and turn st into a central resource fo~ the natron and for other countries The paper anks the hostlhty of the Department of Energ,, and its qatelhte bodies to the Brmsh Govermnent's plan to construct ten pressunsed water reactors aad give a wmor role to nuclear power, plus tiae influence of the oil and gas lobbies
The goal of this paper is to present a theoretical vleu of the co-operatwe relatmnstups between firms mid umversmes We have revised the main subjects and key topics that are analysed m the literature tbcus on umversity-mdustry tmKages As we have identified Science and Pubfic Pot,cy as a lournal that has pubhshed severat articles about umverstt,~-industry collaboratmn, m the second part of the paper we present a selected and annotated blbhograph~ of appropriate articles that were published between 1990 and 2000 by the journal
The development and commerctahsation of genetically modified (GM) crops conunues despite persisung uncertamtms regarding envtronmenta[ ~mpacts Regulators m Canadahav elatrned that ex:stmg federal policies for assessing en¢lronmental hazards are sc:en~e-based' and sutTlciently precautionary. We c)mIlenge flus by examining the smenttfic data used to approve one variety of GM canota for environmental release We argue that the legitimacy and plausibility of the regulatory decision rests significantly on boundaries construeted around the definmon of a 'science-based risk assessment' We advocate a stronger role for the precautmnar) pnnmple Over the last 15 years, budgetar~ restrictions on government departments have, according to some, compronnsed the scientific production of public R&D mboratones Ttus artzcle uses b~bhometnc data to took at the scientific production of Canadian Federal intramural R&D The data show the major amportartce of the Fedora! Government's contnbutmn to the advancement of Canadmn scmnce --over a third of Canadian pubhcatlons m several disc~ph-nary specmhties In the disciplines in which they have dzstmgmshed tnemselves the most, federal researchers have, m terms of the quality of pubhcatmns, no cause to be envmus o1 Canadian researchers in general
The anltc~ent~ficJsmo trend that started m Argentina in 1962 was a resistance to modernization Oscar Varsavsky's best known work of 1969 combined elements of an ultra-lcRtst critique of scmnce wath a critique of the way m which Argentine science was developing He had a very important ideological influence m the l )70s m much of Latin America mem~ techmcal and scientific groups His work was used by obscm-ant~st elements lot repressive pohcms Pubhshed from Cereal Britain by Beech Tree |htbh~hmg. 10 Warlord Ctose (,uddford, Surrey GU I 2FP
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